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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 
132 S. Ct. 680 (2012) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
A widow of an offshore drilling platform employee who was 
killed while working on the onshore oil processing facility petitioned 
for review of the order of the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review 
Board denying her claim for benefits under the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA).1  The Board held 
that Congress intended to limit the coverage provided by the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) to injuries suffered by 
employees within the geographical zone of the Outer Continental 
Shelf (OCS).2  Upon review, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the Board’s decision and determined that, in order to qualify 
for benefits afforded under the OCSLA, a claimant must establish a 
“substantial nexus” between the injury and “extractive operations” on 
the OCS.3  The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari 
and upheld the Ninth Circuit’s ruling requiring a claimant to establish 
a substantial nexus between the injury and the extractive operations 
in order to qualify for the LHWCA benefits provided by the 
OSCLA.4 
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling: 
 
The Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP (Pacific) operates two 
drilling platforms on the OCS off the California Coast and an 
onshore oil and gas processing facility.5  Pacific employed Juan 
                                                          
1 Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. 680, 685 
(2012). 
2 Id.  The geographical zone of the Outer Continental Shelf, known as 
the OCS, refers to the “‘submerged lands’ beyond the extended state boundaries, 
but not the waters above those submerged lands or artificial islands or installations 
attached to the seabed.”  Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 691. 
5 Id. at 684. 
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Valladolid as a general manual laborer, or roustabout, as part of its 
oil exploration and extraction.6  Valladolid spent ninety-eight percent 
of his time working on offshore drilling platforms, and the remainder 
of his time working at the onshore processing facility.  Valladolid 
died while working at the onshore processing facility.7  Valladolid’s 
widow filed a claim for benefits under the LHWCA, which had been 
extended by the OCSLA.8  An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissed the widow’s claim reasoning that Valladolid did not 
qualify for the LHWCA benefits under the OSCLA because his death 
occurred on the onshore facility, not on the offshore drilling 
platforms on the OCS.9  The United States Department of Labor’s 
Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision concluding that 
Congress intended to limit the benefits to injuries that occurred 
within the geographical zone of the OCS.10 
Valladolid’s widow appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the Board’s order.11  The Ninth Circuit determined that the OCSLA 
requires a claimant to establish a substantial nexus between the injury 
and the extractive operations on the OCS.12  Thus, the fact that 
Valladolid died while working at the onshore processing facility did 
not automatically prevent him from qualifying for the LHWCA 
benefits.  The Ninth Circuit’s ruling regarding which employees 
                                                          
6 Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. at 684. 
7 Id. 
8 Id.  The OCSLA provides that, 
  
[w]ith respect to disability or death of an employee 
resulting from an injury occurring as the result of 
operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the 
purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, or 
transporting by pipeline the natural resources, or involving 
rights to the natural resources, of the subsoil and seabed of 
the outer Continental Shelf, compensation shall be payable 
under the provisions of the [LHWCA]. 
 
43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2012). 
9 Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. at 684–85. 
10 Id. at 685.  The ALJ and Board’s interpretation of the OCSLA 
significantly narrowed which employees were eligible for the LHWCA benefits.  
Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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qualified for LHWCA benefits was the third Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ ruling on this issue.13  Therefore, the Supreme Court 
granted Pacific’s petition for writ of certiorari in order to resolve the 
conflict over which employees qualified for LHWCA benefits under 
the OSCLA.14 
All of the Circuits and parties agreed that OCSLA covered 
employees who were injured or killed while working directly on the 
OCS; thus, the question for the Court remained whether the LHWCA 
benefits extended to employees who were injured or killed during 
extraction operations beyond the OCS.15  The Court first examined 
the Third Circuit’s holding.  The Third Circuit had established a “but 
for” causation requirement in which an employee would qualify for 
benefits if the injury would not have occurred “but for” operations on 
the OCS.16  The Court rejected this approach as it would extend 
worker’s compensation benefits to all employees of a business 
engaged in extraction of natural resources on the OCS no matter the 
cause or location of the injury.17  Thus, the Court determined that the 
Third Circuit’s “but for” causation interpretation of the OCSLA was 
too broad and did not comply with the language of the OCSLA or 
Congress’s intent to compensate workers for injuries occurring as a 
result of operations conducted on the OCS.18 
The Court also rejected the Fifth Circuit’s “situs-of-injury” 
interpretation of the OCSLA.19  The Fifth Circuit held that, in order 
to be eligible for workman’s compensation, the injury must occur on 
the OCS; thus the site of the injury would determine eligibility.20  
The Court looked to the language of the OCSLA to determine that 
requiring the injury to occur on the OCS was against Congressional 
                                                          
13 Id.  Both the Third and the Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal had 
previously ruled on similar cases.  Id.  However, each of the three Circuits that had 
addressed this issue regarding employee qualification for LHWCA benefits had 
established a different manner of determining qualification.  Id.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in order to establish a unified manner of determining 
qualification.  Id. 
14 Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. at 685.  
15 Id. at 686.  
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 690–91. 
18 Id. at 691. 
19 Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. at 687. 
20 Id. 
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intent as the language of the act specifically allowed for employees to 
recover for injuries that occurred as a result of the operations 
conducted on the OCS.21  Considering that offshore platforms and 
onshore processing facilities were often connected and employees 
often worked on both sites, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s 
“situs-of-injury” interpretation as too narrow.22  The Court also 
rejected the Solicitor General’s suggestion of a status-based inquiry, 
which would apply two different standards to injuries that occurred 
on the OCS and those that occurred off the OCS.23  The Court 
acknowledged that this suggestion had merit, but determined that the 
language of the OCSLA did not provide for a status-based inquiry, 
and it was up to the Legislature, not the Court to enact new 
legislation.24 
After rejecting these three interpretations, the Court adopted 
the Ninth Circuit’s “substantial nexus” interpretation.  The Ninth 
Circuit determined that an employee could qualify for benefits under 
the OCSLA if he or she can show a substantial nexus between the 
injury and the extractive operations on the OCS.25  Thus, the 
employee must show a significant causal link between the injury he 
or she suffered and the employer’s offshore operations conducted for 
the purpose of extracting natural resources from the OCS.26  The 
Court determined that this “substantial nexus” interpretation best 
reflected the language of the OCSLA, and provided the ALJs and 
courts with discretion to interpret an employee’s eligibility on a case-
by-case basis.27  The Court then remanded the case to Ninth Circuit 
for further proceeding.28 
 
                                                          
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 687–88. 
23 Id. at 690. 
24 Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. at 690.  In refusing to adopt the Solicitor 
General’s status-based inquiry, the Court displays its adherence to its role of 
enforcing the present legislation enacted by Congress, and leaving the drafting of 
legislation to the Legislative Branch.  Id. 
25 Id. at 691. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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Impact: 
 
With this decision, the Court unified the manner in which the 
employees’ eligibility for LHWCA benefits will be evaluated under 
the OCSLA by establishing the “substantial nexus” test as the test to 
apply.  Having an established test to apply may lead to greater 
consistency in the outcomes of these types of cases.  However, the 
“substantial nexus” test places the burden on the petitioner to show 
the injury was substantially related to the offshore operations, which 
may prove a difficult task, especially if an employee is killed and the 
family must provide this information.  Furthermore, the test provides 
the ALJs and courts with a great amount of discretion in determining 
whether a “substantial nexus” exists; thus, these decisions will 
potentially be subject to multiple appeals. 
 
 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
The FCC issued notices of apparent liability against both Fox 
Television Station (Fox) and ABC for violating the FCC’s indecency 
enforcement regime.29  The alleged violations included two isolated 
incidents of fleeting expletives during two Fox broadcasts, and the 
brief showing of a nude buttocks of an adult female during NYPD 
Blue on the ABC network.30  Both Broadcasters petitioned the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review of the FCC 
order.31  The Second Circuit overturned the FCC order against Fox, 
finding it unconstitutionally vague.32  The Second Circuit then 
overturned the order against ABC based on its previous decision in 
Fox.33  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the 
                                                          
29 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2316–17 
(2012). 
30 Id. at 2314. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 2315. 
33 Id. at 2317; see ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 404 F. App’x 530, 533 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
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Fox and ABC cases.34  The Court determined that the FCC’s decision 
to modify its indecency enforcement regime was not arbitrary or 
capricious, but that the FCC’s orders, applied to the broadcasts in 
question, were vague as the FCC failed to provide Fox and ABC with 
sufficient notice of the change in the regime before issuing the 
orders.35  Therefore, the Court set aside the orders.36 
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling: 
 
Before discussing the facts of these cases, it is important to 
understand the regulatory framework through which the FCC 
regulates broadcast indecency.  The FCC was tasked by Congress to 
regulate the use of “any obscene, indecent, or profane language” on 
both radio and television broadcasts.37  Historically, the FCC has not 
sanctioned broadcasters for incidents of isolated or fleeting indecency 
or obscenity.38  Even the framework established by the FCC to help 
broadcasters determine when content is patently offensive refers to 
“whether the material dwells on or repeats at length” obscene or 
indecent content.39  However, in 2004, the FCC changed its 
indecency enforcement regime with the Golden Globes Order, and 
began issuing sanctions for isolated or fleeting incidents of indecency 
or obscenity.40 
There are three separate incidents of alleged indecency 
involved in this case.  The first incident took place during Fox’s 2002 
broadcast of the Billboard Music Awards when singer Cher said 
“f*** ’em” on live television.41  The second incident occurred during 
Fox’s 2003 broadcast of the Billboard Music Awards when Nicole 
Richie remarked “have you ever tried to get cow s*** out of a Prada 
                                                          
34 Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2317. 
35 Id. at 2320. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 2312.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012). 
38 Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2313. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.  See also In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees 
Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 
4975, 4976 n. 4 (2004). 
41 Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2314. 
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purse?  It’s not so f***ing simple”.42  The third incident occurred in 
2003 when ABC broadcast the nude buttocks of an adult female 
character for about seven seconds and the side of her breast for a 
moment during an episode of NYPD Blue.43  These incidents all 
occurred before the Golden Globes Order; however, the FCC applied 
the new policy regarding sanctioning broadcasters for fleeting 
expletives and nudity to all three incidents.44 
The FCC applied its tripartite definition of patently offensive 
material45 and the new Golden Globes Order allowing for sanctioning 
of isolated or fleeting incidents of indecency to the two Fox 
broadcasts involving expletives.46  The FCC found the expletives 
actionable indecency, and Fox appealed to the Second Circuit.47  The 
Second Circuit found the FCC order arbitrary and capricious as the 
FCC changed its indecency enforcement regime without providing a 
reasonable explanation.48  The Supreme Court then found that the 
FCC order was not arbitrary or capricious as the FCC did not have to 
provide a detailed justification for the change in policy, and the 
reasons for expanding the scope of the enforcement regime were 
rational. 49  Thus, the Court remanded the Fox case to the Second 
Circuit.50  The Second Circuit then held that the FCC’s order against 
                                                          
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 2315. 
45 Id.  The FCC’s tripartite definition of patently offensive includes the 
following three factors: 
  
1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or 
depiction of sexual or excretory organs or activities; 2) 
whether the material dwells on or repeats at length 
descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities; 3) 
whether the material appears to pander or is used to 
titillate, or whether the material appears to have been 
presented for its shock value. 
 
In re Indus. Guidance on Comm’ns Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and 
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999 (2001). 
46 Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2315.  
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 2316. 
50 Id. 
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Fox was unconstitutionally vague and invalidated the FCC’s 
indecency policy as the FCC failed to give notice to broadcasters of 
what would be considered indecent under the new policy.51   
The FCC also applied the same tripartite definition of patently 
offensive material and the new Golden Globes Order to ABC’s 
fleeting broadcast of nudity, and found the nudity patently 
offensive.52  The FCC imposed a forfeiture on each of the 45 ABC-
affiliated stations that aired the NYPD Blue episode.53  ABC 
petitioned the Second Circuit for review of the FCC’s order, and the 
Second Circuit vacated the forfeiture order based on its decision to 
invalidate the FCC indecency policy in the Fox case. 54  The Supreme 
Court consolidated the Fox and ABC cases, and granted certiorari.55 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires 
invalidation of impermissibly vague laws; thus, the Court had to 
determine whether the FCC’s new indecency enforcement regime 
was impermissibly vague.56  In order to avoid vagueness, the Court 
asserted that regulated parties should know what the law requires of 
them, and that precision and guidance are necessary to ensure 
enforcement is not arbitrary or discriminatory.57  The Court then 
looked to the policies in place during the incidents of alleged 
indecency.58  All three of the incidents occurred prior to the FCC’s 
change in their indecency enforcement regime; therefore, the Court 
determined that the policy in place at the time of the broadcasts in 
question did not provide Fox or ABC with notice that a fleeting 
expletive or brief showing of nudity would be considered actionable 
indecency.59  By failing to provide Fox and ABC with notice that 
their policies regarding fleeting expletives and nudity had changed, 
the FCC failed to adhere to its own regulatory standards of providing 
“fair notice of what is prohibited.”60  Furthermore, the fact that the 
                                                          
51 Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2316.  
52 Id. at 2316–17. 
53 Id. at 2317. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2317.  
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 2318. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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FCC claimed it would not consider Fox’s prior indecent broadcasts in 
any subsequent actions, was insufficient to remedy the constitutional 
violation.61  Thus, the Court held that the FCC’s failure to provide 
sufficient notice caused the standards applied to the Fox and ABC 
broadcasts in question to be unconstitutionally vague and set aside 
the FCC orders.62 
 
Impact: 
 
The Court resolved these cases on fair notice grounds under 
the Due Process clause.63  Therefore, the Court has yet to address the 
First Amendment implications of the FCC’s indecency policy.  
Additionally, the Court only ruled that the broadcasters lacked notice 
that their broadcasts would be actionably indecent under the then-
existing FCC indecency regime.  The Court did not address the 
constitutionality of the FCC’s new indecency policy under the 
Golden Globes Order.64  Thus, the Court will likely have to address 
both the First Amendment and constitutionality issues in subsequent 
cases.  Finally, the Court upheld the FCC’s right to modify its current 
indecency policy depending on the FCC’s discretion regarding pubic 
interest and legal requirements.65 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL 
 
Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty 
Board, 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs) set default royalty rates and 
terms applicable to Internet-based “webcasting” of digitally recorded 
                                                          
61 Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2318.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 2320. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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music.66  Intercollegiate, an association of noncommercial 
webcasters, appealed the CRJs final decision in Intercollegiate 
Broadcasting System, Inc. alleging that the position and authority of 
CRJs violates the Appointment Clause.67  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated and remanded the 
CRJ’s final decision, founding that the CRJ’s position violated the 
Appointment Clause.68  The Court invalidated and severed the 
restrictions on the Librarian of Congress’s ability to remove CRJs, 
thus resolving the constitutional problem.69 
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling: 
 
The Copyright Royalty Board was established in 2004 and is 
composed of three Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs) who are 
appointed by the Librarian of Congress.  This Board is the 
administrative body responsible for adjusting and setting reasonable 
rates and terms of royalty payments.70  In 2008, SoundExchange, 
Inc., a non-profit clearinghouse for musicians’ webcast royalty 
payments, initiated ratemaking proceedings before the CRJs to set 
default rates for the years 2011-2015.71  Intercollegiate could not 
reach a settlement regarding the default rates, and thus the CRJs 
issued a final decision in which the CRJs adopted the royalty 
structure of a $500 flat annual fee per station for both “educational” 
and other noncommercial webcasters whose “Aggregate Tuning 
Hours” stay below a monthly threshold.72  The CRJs specifically 
rejected Intercollegiate’s proposal to establish different rate 
structures for “small” and “very small” noncommercial webcasters 
like Intercollegiate.73 
Intercollegiate appealed the CRJs final decision pursuant to 
Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, 17 U.S.C. 
                                                          
66 Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 
1332, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
67 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
68 Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at 1334. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1335. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at 1335. 
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§§ 803(d)(1) and (d)(3).74  Intercollegiate also alleged that the CRJ’s 
power was unsuitable for an Article III court, however, the Court of 
Appeals did not address this objection.75  Intercollegiate specifically 
alleged that the CRJs violated the Appointment Clause art. II § 2, cl. 
2 on two grounds: (1) the CRJs exercise a significant amount of 
ratemaking authority without the effective control of a superior, 
making them “principal” officers who must be appointed by the 
President with Senate confirmation; and (2) even if the CRJs are 
“inferior” officers, the Librarian of Congress is not a “Head of 
Department” in whom Congress may vest appointment power.76   
The Court of Appeals evaluated each of the alleged violations 
in turn and agreed with Intercollegiate as to the first claim, but not 
the second.77  Regarding the first violation, the Court looked at all of 
the powers CRJs hold and determined that CRJs exercise significant 
authority as they had broad discretion in determining reasonable 
rates, and that their ratemaking decisions have considerable 
consequences for entire industries.78  Furthermore, the Court applied 
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997) when evaluating 
whether the CRJs were principal or inferior officers for purposes of 
the Appointment Clause.79  The Court determined that because the 
Librarian of Congress can only remove the CRJs for misconduct or 
neglect of duty and because the CRJs decisions are final for the 
executive branch, the CRJs are principal officers.80   
                                                          
74 Any aggrieved participant in the proceedings may appeal the CRJ’s 
decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.  
See 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(1) (2012).  The Court of Appeals can modify or vacate a 
determination of the CRJs and enter its own determination with respect to the 
royalty rates or the Court may vacate the determination and remand the case back 
to the CRJs for further proceedings.  See 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(3) (2012). 
75 Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at 1336. 
76 Id.  The Librarian of Congress appoints the CRJs to the Copyright 
Royalty Board for a staggered six-year term.  Id. at 1333. 
77 Id. at 1337. 
78 Id. at 1338–39. 
79 Id.  The degree to which an officer is principal or inferior with 
regards to the Appointment Clause depends on the degree to which that officer was 
directed and supervised by a presidential appointee.  Id.  Therefore, the greater 
amount of supervision the greater likelihood the officer will be inferior.  Id. 
80 Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at 1340.  
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As the CRJs are principal officers, the structure of the 
Copyright Royalty Board violates the Appointments Clause because 
principal officers must be appointed by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate.81  In order to remedy this violation, the Court of 
Appeals invalidated and severed the restrictions on the Librarian of 
Congress’s ability to remove the CRJs.82  By removing these 
restrictions, the Librarian of Congress can direct, supervise, and exert 
some control over the CRJ’s decisions.83  Thus, the Librarian of 
Congress, as a principal officer, constrains the CRJs authority 
making the CRJs inferior officers under the Appointment Clause.84 
Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected Intercollegiate’s second 
allegation that the Librarian of Congress was not a “Head of 
Department.”85  The Court determined that the Library of Congress 
was a freestanding entity that met the definition of “Department” as it 
performs a range of different services and is exercised primarily for 
legislative purposes.86  Furthermore, as the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate appoints the Librarian of Congress, the 
Librarian of Congress is a Head of Department as defined in the 
Appointment Clause.87  Therefore, the Librarian of Congress has the 
authority to appoint the CRJs.88 
 
Impact: 
 
Though the D.C. Circuit sought to resolve the constitutional 
violations in a manner that would cause the least disruption possible 
to the structure of the Copyright Royalties Board, the D.C. Circuit 
essentially limited the authority of CRJs and the Copyright Royalties 
Board.  Even though their individual decisions are not reversible, the 
                                                          
81 Id.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (2012). 
82 Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at 1340. 
83 Id. at 1341. 
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  The Library of Congress is a “freestanding component of the 
Executive Branch, not subordinate to or contained within any other such 
component,” and thus “constitutes a ‘Department’ for purposes of the Appointment 
Clause.”  See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 
3138, 3162 (2010). 
87 Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at 1341. 
88 Id. 
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threat of removal provides the Librarian of Congress with significant 
influence over the ratemaking power of the CRJs.  Thus, the 
Copyright Royalties Board becomes subject to direct influence and 
supervision of the Librarian of Congress.  As the President with the 
advice of the Senate appoints the Librarian of Congress, the 
ratemaking decisions of the CRJs may become indirectly influenced 
by the political and economic agenda of the Executive Branch.  
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit refused to address Intercollegiate’s 
arguments regarding the merits of the rates set by the CRJs.  Thus, 
the D.C. Circuit’s refusal to address this argument left it open and 
subject to future challenges and litigation both at the Copyright 
Royalty Board and the Appellate Court level. 
 
 
Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA, 
693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
Three trade organizations comprised of engine manufacturers, 
petroleum suppliers, and food producers, petitioned for review of the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) final decision to grant 
Clean Air Act (CAA) partial waivers approving the introduction of 
E15, a blend of gasoline and 15% ethanol, into commerce for use in 
select motor vehicles and engines.89  The introduction of E15 was 
pursuant to the renewable fuel standard (RFS) of the Energy Policy 
Act.90  The D.C. Circuit dismissed all petitions for lack of 
jurisdiction, as the D.C. Circuit determined that all three trade 
organizations lacked standing.91 
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling: 
 
In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress incorporated the 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) into the Clean Air Act (CAA).92  
                                                          
89 Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 180. 
92 Id. at 172.  See also Pub. L. No. 109–58, § 1501(a), 119 Stat. 594 
(2005) (RFS). 
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The RFS requires qualifying refiners and importers of gasoline or 
diesel fuel to introduce into United States’ commerce a specified 
volume of renewable fuel.93  The refiners and importers primarily 
blend corn-based ethanol into the fuel supply to meet the RFS 
requirements.94  In order to bring a new renewable fuel to market, the 
manufacturer must apply for a waiver of the CAA restriction, which 
limits manufacturers from introducing into commerce “‘any fuel or 
fuel additive […] which is not substantially similar to any fuel or 
additive used in federal emissions certification.’”95  The 
Administrator of the EPA may grant a waiver if he determines that 
the applicant can establish that the fuel or fuel additive, or a specified 
concentration thereof, and its emissions products will not cause or 
contribute to a vehicle failing the emission standards.96   
In 2009, Growth Energy applied for a CAA Section 211(f)(4) 
waiver to introduce E15, a gasoline blend with fifteen percent 
ethanol, into the market.97  The EPA granted Growth Energy two 
partial waivers.  The first waiver approved E15 for use in light-duty 
motor vehicles from model year 2007 and later.98  The second waiver 
extended the use of E15 in light-duty motor vehicles and engines 
from model years 2001-2006.99  These waivers are conditioned on 
the E15 manufacturers submitting a plan for the implementation of 
“misfueling mitigation conditions” for approval by the EPA.100  After 
the EPA granted these waivers, three trade organizations representing 
engine manufacturers, petroleum suppliers, and food producers, 
petitioned the court for review of the EPA waivers.101  The 
Petitioners alleged that (1) the EPA lacks authority under the CAA 
                                                          
93 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
94 Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 173.  The current national gasoline 
supply consists of E10, gasoline blended with 10 percent ethanol.  Id. 
95 Id.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(f)(4) (2012). 
96 Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 173. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  Misfueling refers to the use of E15 fuel in pre 2001 vehicles and 
other non-approved vehicles, engines, and equipment.  Id.  The plan for 
implementing misfueling mitigation conditions includes pump-labeling 
requirements, participation in pump-labeling and fuel-sample compliance surveys, 
and proper documentation of ethanol content on transfer documents.  Id. 
101 Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 173. 
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section 211(f)(4) to grant partial waivers approving the use of E15; 
(2) Growth Energy failed to meet a required evidentiary burden under 
section 211(f)(4); (3) the EPA failed to provide sufficient opportunity 
to comment on the waiver decision; and (4) the record does not 
support the EPA’s decision to grant the partial waivers.102  The D.C. 
Circuit never addressed the merits of the Petitioners’ claims as the 
D.C. Circuit determined that none of the three petitioners had 
standing, and thus dismissed all petitions for lack of jurisdiction.103 
The D.C. Circuit first established that all three trade 
organizations had standing to sue on behalf of its members; however, 
the organizations needed to show that a member would have standing 
to sue in his or her own right.104  Thus, the organizations needed to 
show that approving the partial waivers for E15 caused any of their 
members injury in fact for which the court could provide redress.105  
The engine manufacturers’ organization asserted that the waiver 
approving E15 injured their members because individuals will use 
the E15 fuel in unauthorized vehicles and engines, thus causing harm 
to the emission control devices and systems and subjecting the engine 
manufactures to liability.106  The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument 
on two grounds.  First, the engine manufacturers failed to provide 
any evidence of a substantial probability that E15 would cause engine 
harm.107  Second, the engine manufacturers based their theory of 
causation on the acts of third parties, not the EPA’s granting of the 
partial waivers.108  The engine manufacturers alleged that misfueling 
would subject them to liability; however, any harm that might occur 
would be caused by third party consumers who misfueled engines 
with E15, not the actual approval of E15 by the EPA.109  
Furthermore, the engine manufacturers failed to indicate why they 
would be subject to liability for damages caused by consumer-
                                                          
102 Id. at 173–74. 
103 Id. at 174, 180. 
104 Id. at 175. 
105 Id. 
106 Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 175. 
107 Id. at 176. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
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induced misfueling.110  Thus, the D.C Circuit determined the engine 
manufacturers failed to establish standing to bring their petition. 
The D.C. Circuit next looked to the standing of the petroleum 
suppliers.  The petroleum suppliers alleged that introducing E15 into 
the market would subject their members to substantial costs including 
special fuel production, transportation, and fuel segregation.111  
However, the petroleum suppliers failed to show how these costs 
were related to the EPA’s approval of E15’s use in certain 
vehicles.112  By granting the partial waivers, the EPA in no way 
forced, required, or encouraged the petroleum suppliers to introduce 
the new fuel.113  The partial waivers simply provide fuel 
manufacturers and petroleum suppliers the option of introducing the 
new fuel.114  The petroleum suppliers have the choice whether to 
assume the costs associated with dealing with E15; thus, any injury 
which may stem from this choice is a self-inflicted harm that is in no 
way traceable to the EPA’s granting of the partial waivers.115  As the 
alleged potential liability of introducing E15 is assumed voluntarily, 
and not traceable to the EPA’s actions, the petroleum suppliers also 
lack standing to bring their petition.116 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit examined the standing of the food 
producers’ organization.  The food producers alleged that the EPA’s 
partial waivers approving the introduction of E15 would increase the 
demand for corn; hence increasing the prices their members would 
have to pay for corn.117  The food producers argue that this interest is 
protected by the Energy Independence and Securities Act (EISA), 
which requires the EPA to review the impact the use of renewable 
fuels will have on the supply and price of agricultural commodities 
when setting renewable fuel volume requirements.118  However, the 
                                                          
110 Id. 
111 Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 177. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id.  The D.C. Circuit notes that the petroleum suppliers’ argument 
that the introduction of E15 is forced due to the renewable fuel RFS requirements.  
Id.  However, the petroleum suppliers did not attempt to trace the alleged injuries to 
the RFS requirements, but challenged the partial waivers.  Id. 
116 Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 178. 
117 Id. at 179. 
118 Id.  The EISA was the legislation that set forth the RFS.  Id. 
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D.C. Circuit determined that this argument lacked prudential standing 
as the interest the food producers sought to protect, the price of corn, 
was not within the zone of interests the CAA fuel waiver provision 
sought to protect or regulate.119  The D.C. Circuit determined that 
maintaining a low price of corn was too far removed from partial 
waivers approving the introduction of renewable fuel sources; 
therefore, the food producers also lacked standing to bring their 
petition.120  After determining that none of the trade organizations 
had standing, the D.C. Circuit dismissed all petitions for lack of 
jurisdiction.121 
 
Impact: 
 
With this decision, the D.C. Circuit both clarified and 
narrowed the petitioners who would have standing to challenge a 
similar EPA waiver in the future.  However, in mentioning that 
petroleum suppliers might be forced to assume liability by the RFS, 
the D.C. Circuit also provided a potential means for this trade 
organization to establish standing and challenge similar EPA waivers 
on alternative grounds.  The D.C. Circuit also seemed to show 
deference to the EPA and its findings regarding the appropriateness 
of approving implementation of E15 into the United States’ market.  
Furthermore, because the D.C. Circuit dismissed all petitions for lack 
of jurisdiction, the D.C. Circuit never addressed the merits of the 
petitioners’ allegations.  Therefore, as no precedent was established, 
the D.C. Circuit and/or other Circuits will likely be presented with 
similar petitions for review of EPA waivers. 
 
 
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
In 2012, the EPA approved an interim final rule (IFR), which 
permitted manufacturers of heavy-duty diesel engines to continue 
                                                          
119 Id. at 178.  See also Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 
287 F.3d 1130, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
120 Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 179. 
121 Id. at 180. 
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selling non-compliant engines if they paid nonconformance penalties 
(NCPs).122  When approving the IFR, the EPA invoked the “good 
cause” exception provided by the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), and made the decision without providing formal notice or an 
opportunity for comment.123  Manufacturers of compliant heavy-duty 
diesel engines petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit for review of the IFR.124  The D.C. Circuit determined 
that the EPA failed to meet the statutory criteria for invoking the 
“good cause” exception, and therefore vacated the IFR.125 
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling: 
 
In 2001, the EPA, through the Clean Air Act (CAA), enacted 
a rule requiring a 95% reduction in emissions of nitrogen oxide from 
heavy-duty diesel engines.126  The EPA provided the industry nine 
years to develop the necessary technologies for compliance, and 
established the effective date as 2010, effectively referred to as the 
2010 NOx standard.127  During the nine-year interim, most heavy-
duty diesel engine manufacturers invested in a technology called 
“selective catalytic reduction” as this technology allowed the 
manufacturers to meet the 2010 NOx standard.128  One manufacturer, 
Navistar, invested in “exhaust gas recirculation” instead.129  
However, this technology proved less effective, and the Navistar 
engines failed to meet the 2010 NOx standard. 130  Navistar continued 
to pursue this “exhaust gas recirculation” technology and continued 
to sell the noncompliant engines for the past few years by utilizing 
emissions credits, but these credits are running out.131  Thus, Navistar 
                                                          
122 Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 87. 
125 Id. at 89. 
126 Id. 
127 Mack Trucks, 682 F.3d at 89. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
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will soon be unable to sell the noncompliant heavy-duty diesel 
engines in the United States.132 
Recognizing that Navistar was running out of credits, the 
EPA issued an interim final rule (IFR), which allowed manufacturers 
of heavy-duty diesel engines, like Navistar, to continue selling non-
compliant engines if they paid nonconformance penalties (NCPs).133  
In order to issue the NCPs, the EPA must find the new emission 
standard is “more stringent” or “more difficult to achieve” than a 
prior standard, that “substantial work will be required to meet the 
standard for which the NCP is offered,” and that “there is likely to be 
a technological laggard.”134  The EPA determined that the 2010 NOx 
standard met these three criteria as the new standard permits a 
significantly smaller amount of emissions than the prior standard; the 
standards will require substantial work as compliant engines will 
require new technologies; and that there is likely to be a laggard 
because an engine manufacturer, Navistar, has not met the 
compliance requirements for technological reasons.135  Once the EPA 
determined that the NCP criteria was met, the EPA set the penalty 
amount and established the highest limit of emissions permitted for 
the noncompliant heavy-duty diesel engines.136 
When authorizing the NCPs, the EPA also forewent notice 
and comment procedures by invoking the “good cause” exception of 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  The EPA justified this 
action by claiming that notice and comment procedures were 
impracticable, unnecessary, and contrary to public interest.137  
Specifically, providing for notice and comment would mean (1) the 
possibility that an engine manufacturer would be unable to certify a 
2012 and 2013 product line; (2) the EPA only amended limited 
provisions in existing NCP regulations; (3) the IFR was for limited 
duration; and (4) there was no risk to public interest in providing the 
                                                          
132 Mack Trucks, 682 F.3d at 89. 
133 Id. at 90. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id.  The EPA set the penalty amount at $1,919 per engine and the 
emissions limit at fewer than 0.50 grams of nitrogen oxide per horsepower-hour.  
Id.  This emissions limit is two and a half times the emissions allowed by the 2010 
NOx standard.  Id. 
137 Mack Trucks, 682 F.3d at 90. 
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option of NCPs for manufacturers.138  In response, manufacturers of 
compliant heavy-duty diesel fuel engines requested administrative 
stay of the EPA’s IFR.139  The compliant manufacturers asserted that 
the EPA lacked good cause when issuing the IFR, that the EPA 
misapplied its own regulatory criteria for determining when a penalty 
is warranted, and that the EPA arbitrarily and capriciously set the 
amount of the penalty and the permissible emissions limit.140  The 
EPA denied the manufacturer’s request for administrative review; 
thus, the manufacturers petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review of the 
EPA’s IFR.  The D.C. Circuit determined that the compliant 
manufacturers had standing as direct competitors to Navistar, and 
thus granted the review.141 
The D.C. Circuit had to determine whether notice and 
comment requirements of the NCPs were impracticable, unnecessary, 
or contrary to public interest, thus allowing the EPA to invoke the 
good cause exception and dispense with notice and comment 
requirements when issuing the IFR.142  First, the EPA determined that 
the notice and comment requirement was not impracticable as the 
main purpose of the IFR was to allow Navistar to certify a complete 
product line of engines in the years 2012 and 2013 despite 
noncompliance.143  Thus, notice and comment would have been 
practicable as the IFR does not prevent any imminent threat to the 
environment, safety, or national security, but instead only addresses 
the potential economic harm faced by Navistar for noncompliance.144   
Second, the D.C. Circuit examined whether notice and 
comment was unnecessary by determining if the administrative 
decision was routine, insignificant in nature and impact, and 
inconsequential to the industry and to the public.145  The D.C. Circuit 
determined that the IFR was not unnecessary as members of public, 
specifically the compliant manufacturers, were greatly interested in 
                                                          
138 Id. at 90–91. 
139 Id. at 91. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Mack Trucks, 682 F.3d at 93. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 94. 
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the IFR decision and the impact it would have on the industry.146  
Furthermore, the IFR was not routine or insignificant as the IFR 
implemented an NCP that established a higher emissions limit and 
penalty.147   
Finally, the D.C. Circuit evaluated whether the notice and 
comment would be contrary to public interest.148  The public interest 
aspect of the good cause exception only applies in rare circumstances 
when procedures presumed to serve the public interest would actually 
harm the interest.149  However, in this situation, the only harm the 
EPA suggests will occur is the economic harm Navistar might suffer 
from not certifying a complete product line.150  The D.C. determined 
that this argument failed to establish notice and comment was 
contrary to public interest.151 
As the EPA failed to establish that notice and comment would 
be impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to public interest, the EPA 
incorrectly invoked the good cause exception when issuing the 
IFR.152  Therefore, the D.C. Circuit vacated the IFR and remanded 
the case for further proceedings.153 
 
Impact: 
 
With this decision, the D.C. Circuit reminded the EPA that it 
must follow appropriate administrative procedures when invoking 
IFRs.  The NCPs are meant to be temporary means for manufacturers 
to meet new compliance standards, and should only be available 
when the manufacturers have made every effort to comply with the 
standards.  Thus, the NCPs are not meant to bail out manufacturers 
who voluntarily continued to adopt a noncompliant technology.  
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that the EPA must prevent 
NCPs from providing a competitive disadvantage to manufactures 
who comply with new regulations, as these manufactures assumed 
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147 Mack Trucks, 682 F.3d at 94. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Mack Trucks, 682 F.3d at 94. 
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the costs of developing and implementing compliant technologies.  
Overall, with this decision, the D.C. Circuit established that any EPA 
exceptions to new compliance regulations should be narrowly 
construed and reluctantly countenanced154 and that the notice and 
comment requirements of the NCPs process will be strongly 
enforced. 
 
 
Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
Environmental organizations brought an action against the 
United States Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS) challenging the FWS 
delisting of the West Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel under the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA).155  The United States District Court 
of Columbia granted the organization’s summary judgment 
determining that the FWS violated the ESA by removing the West 
Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel from the list of endangered species 
when several criteria in the agency’s Recovery Plan for the species 
were not satisfied.156  The FWS appealed the summary judgment, and 
the United States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia 
determined that the district court erred in its interpretation that the 
Recovery Plan was binding on the Secretary of the Interior in his 
delisting decisions.157  The D.C. Circuit also determined that the 
FWS’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law; 
thus, the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded the summary 
judgment.158 
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling: 
 
The West Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel historically lives 
in the Southern Appalachian Mountains; however, in 1985 the Fish 
                                                          
154 Id. at 96. 
155 Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428, 429 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
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and Wildlife Service (FWS) documented only ten living squirrels and 
deemed the species endangered.159  As required by the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA), the FWS created a recovery plan for the 
“conservation and survival” of the squirrel.160  The plan established 4 
criteria that when accomplished the squirrel could be removed from 
the list of endangered species.161  These criteria included: (1) the 
squirrel population was expanding at a minimum of 80% across all 
Geographic Recovery Areas (GRAs); (2) there is sufficient 
ecological data and timber management data to assure future 
protection and management; (3) GRAs are managed to ensure 
sufficient habitat and habitat corridors; and (4) the existence of high 
elevation forests is not threatened by pests or environmental 
pollutants.162   
In 2002, the FWS hired a biologist to investigate the 
possibility of removing the squirrel from the endangered species 
list.163  In 2006, the Secretary of the Interior relied on the 
persistence164 of the squirrel population to determine that the 
population was robust, and thus the squirrel no longer met the 
definition of endangered or threatened.165  Furthermore, the Secretary 
determined that the recovery plan criteria are not explicit reference 
points for delisting a species, as the criteria do not specifically 
address the five threat factors used for delisting a species.166  
Therefore, the criteria only serve as guidance for the Secretary when 
determining when recovery has been achieved and if a species should 
be delisted.167   
The Friends of Blackwater filed a complaint in the district 
court alleging that the FWS violated the ESA by delisting the squirrel 
                                                          
159 Id. at 430. 
160 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 430. 
161 Id. at 431. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id.  The FWS defined persistence as “continuing capture of [the 
squirrel] over multiple generations at previously documented sites throughout the 
historical [habitat] range.”  Id.  In 2006, as opposed to the 10 squirrels captured in 
1990, the scientists investigating the squirrel population captured 1,063 individual 
squirrels at 107 sites.  Id. 
165 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 431. 
166 Id. 
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before meeting the criteria in the Recovery Plan, and alleged that the 
use of persistence to delist the species was arbitrary and capricious as 
it did not rely on the best available science.168  The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Friends of Blackwater on 
the grounds that the Secretary was bound by the criteria in the 
Recovery Plan, and his decision to delist the squirrel without meeting 
the criteria constituted a revision to the Recovery Plan without proper 
notice and comment procedures as required by the EAS.169  The FWS 
appealed the summary judgment, and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia granted review.170 
The D.C. Circuit first examined the Friends of Blackwater’s 
claim that the criteria of the Recovery Plan must be met before a 
species can be delisted.171  In order to resolve this, the D.C. Circuit 
looked to the language of the ESA; however, they determined that the 
statute was ambiguous.172  After looking at the legislative history and 
structure of the ESA, the D.C. Circuit determined that, although the 
Secretary was required to design and implement a Recovery Plan, the 
Plan is only a statement of intention, not a binding contract on the 
FWS or the Secretary.173  However, the D.C. Circuit was careful to 
emphasize that the Secretary should use the Recovery Plan criteria as 
guidance when making delisting decisions.174   
Next, the D.C. Circuit evaluated whether the Secretary’s 
reliance on persistence was arbitrary and capricious.175  The Friends 
of Blackwater allege that because the Secretary failed to use 
population-based data, the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and 
capricious.176  However, the D.C. Circuit determined that the 
Secretary was only required to use the best available data, and is not 
required to conduct its own independent studies when determining 
                                                          
168 Id. at 432. 
169 Id. 
170 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 432. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 433–34.  The D.C. Circuit emphasized the fact that events may 
occur over the lifetime of the Recovery Plan, which make meeting the criteria of 
the Plan irrelevant; thus, the Secretary needs to be free to delist the species without 
meeting the criteria.  Id. at 434. 
174 Id. 
175 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 434. 
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whether to delist a species.177  The best available data requirement of 
the ESA only prevents the Secretary from disregarding available 
scientific evidence that is better or more reliable than evidence the 
Secretary would rely on.  In this situation, the Secretary adequately 
showed that population data was not available, but data on the 
persistence of the squirrels was available.178  Therefore, the 
Secretary’s reliance on the persistence data to determine that the 
squirrel population was no longer endangered was reasonable, and 
not arbitrary or capricious.179 
The D.C. Circuit determined that the Secretary reasonably 
interpreted that the ESA does not require the Recovery Plan criteria 
to be met before removing a species from the list of endangered 
species, and that the Secretaries reliance on persistence data was not 
arbitrary or capricious.  Thus, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district 
courts’ summary judgment order. 
 
Impact: 
 
With this decision, the D.C. Circuit provided the Secretary of 
the Interior with broad authority to determine when a species can be 
removed from the list of endangered species.  This decision 
establishes that though the FWS must design and implement a 
Recovery Plan when declaring a species endangered, the criteria in 
this plan only serve as guidance when determining whether a species 
should be removed from the list of endangered species.  Thus, the 
Secretary of the Interior retains the ultimate authority in determining 
the status of allegedly threatened or endangered species. 
 
 
Watson v. Solis, 693 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2012) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
In 2002, Patricia Watson (“Watson”) filed a claim for 
survivor benefits under the Department of Labor’s Energy 
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 
                                                          
177 Id. at 435. 
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179 Id. at 435–36. 
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(“Act”).180  The Department of Labor denied Watson’s claim, finding 
that she was not “incapable of self-support,” and therefore not 
entitled to benefits under the Act as a “covered child.”181  Watson 
filed a complaint in the district court seeking review of the 
Department of Labor’s interpretation and application of the Act.182  
The district court denied Watson’s motion for summary judgment 
and dismissed her case with prejudice.183  Watson appealed the 
district court’s decision, alleging that the Department of Labor acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying her claim for benefits.184  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted review 
and determined that the Department of Labor did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously in denying Watson benefits under the Act.185  Thus, the 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.186 
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling: 
 
In 2000, Congress enacted the Energy Employees 
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act in order to provide 
benefits to employees with illnesses caused by exposure to radiation 
and other toxic substances during their work for the Department of 
Energy or its predecessor agencies.187  Under this Act the employees 
or their eligible survivors could receive a lump sum payment of 
$150,000 as compensation and medical benefits for covered 
individuals.188  The Act determined that: 
 
[A] covered employee’s child is eligible for 
survivor compensation as a covered child if 
said child: as of the employee’s death— 
(a) had not attained the age of 18 years;  
                                                          
180 Watson v. Solis, 693 F.3d 620, 622 (6th Cir. 2012). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Watson, 693 F.3d at 626. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 622.  See Hayward v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 536 F.3d 376, 377 
(5th Cir. 2008). 
188 Watson, 693 F.3d at 622. 
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(b) had not attained the age of 23 years and 
was a full-time student who has continuously 
enrolled as a full-time student in one or more 
educational institutions since attaining the age 
of 18 years; or  
(c) had been incapable of self support.189 
 
Watson’s father worked as a contractor for the Department of 
Energy from 1954 to 1962, and he died from complications from 
Hodgkin’s disease in 1964.  When her father died Watson was 
nineteen years old, was not a full-time student, worked as a waitress, 
relied on her parents for economic support, and was declared a 
dependent on her parent’s income tax returns.190  In 2002, Watson 
filed claims for survivor benefits with the Department of Labor and 
received a lump sum compensation of $150,000 as a survivor of a 
covered employee with an occupational illness resulting from 
radiation exposure.191  Later, Watson filed a claim for more 
compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 7385s 3(d)(2)(c) of the Act, 
claiming as a covered child she was “incapable of self-support” at the 
time of her father’s death.192  The Department of Labor denied her 
claim finding that she was not “incapable of self-support” as she 
failed to provide evidence that she was “physically or mentally 
incapable of self-support” as required by the Department of Labor’s 
Procedure Manual to receive compensation under this section.193 
Watson challenged the Department of Labor’s interpretation 
of “incapable of self-support” in the District Court claiming the 
Department’s requirement of a showing of physical or mental 
incapability is impermissible.194  The District Court denied Watson’s 
motion for summary judgment, and found that the Department of 
Labor’s interpretation of “incapable of self-support” was persuasive. 
                                                          
189 Id.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 7385s 3(d)(2) (2012). 
190 Watson, 693 F.3d at 623. 
191 Id.  The compensation that Watson received in 2002 came under a 
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195  Thus the Department did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in 
denying Watson’s claim.196  Watson appealed the District Court’s 
decision, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
reviewed the District Court’s denial of the summary judgment de 
novo.197 
The Sixth Circuit determined that under section 7385s (6)(a) 
of the Act, a court may only modify or set aside a federal agency’s 
final decision regarding survivor benefits if the court finds that the 
agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.198  This is a 
deferential standard of review in which the decision will not be 
arbitrary or capricious if the agency can present a reasonable 
explanation, based on evidence, for the outcome of its decision.199  In 
reviewing the Department of Labor’s interpretation of “incapable of 
self-support,” the Sixth Circuit applied the two step process utilized 
by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 
837 (1984).200  Applying the two-step process, the Sixth Circuit first 
determined that the term “incapable of self-support” is ambiguous as 
it could refer to lacking financial capacity for independent support or 
it could refer to lacking physical or mental ability to support 
oneself.201 
As the term is ambiguous, the Sixth Circuit then had to 
determine if the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the Act was 
permissible.202  The Department of Labor’s interpretation of 
“incapable of self-support” is found in an agency manual; thus, the 
permissibility of the interpretation must be determined by looking at 
the thoroughness of its consideration, the validity of the reasoning, 
                                                          
195 Watson, 693 F.3d at 623. 
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199 Cox v. Standard Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 295, 299 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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and its consistency with other Congressional interpretations.203  
These factors determine whether the Department of Labor’s 
interpretation of “incapable of self-support” as “mentally or 
physically incapable of self-support” is persuasive, and thus 
permissible.204  The Sixth Circuit first determined that the focus on 
mental or physical disability was consistent with the established 
Congressional interpretation that federal compensation programs 
were generally meant to cover dependents incapable of self-support 
due to “physical or mental disabilities.”205  This established 
interpretation was also thoroughly considered as Congress has 
adopted this interpretation of incapable of self-support since the mid 
1920s.206  The Sixth Circuit also found that the Department of 
Labor’s interpretation of “incapable” was persuasive as “incapable” 
is commonly defined as “suffering from such a degree of mental or 
physical weakness.”207  Furthermore, by adopting this interpretation 
of “incapable of self-support,” the Department of Labor established a 
class of identifiable beneficiaries, which remain consistent with other 
federal statutes.208  Therefore, the Sixth Circuit determined the 
Department of Labor’s interpretation to be persuasive.209 
After determining that the Department of Labor’s 
interpretation of “incapable of self-support” as physically or mentally 
incapable of supporting one’s self was persuasive, the Sixth Circuit 
determined that the Department of Labor did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously in denying Watson benefits under section 7385s 
3(d)(2)(c).  The Department of Labor denied Watson’s claim because 
she failed to provide evidence of a physical or mental condition, 
which made her incapable of self-support.210  Watson only provided 
evidence of her economic situation, despite the Department of 
Labor’s requests for records of physical or mental disabilities.211  As 
                                                          
203 Id. at 624–625.  See also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 325 U.S 134 
(2000). 
204 Watson, 693 F.3d at 625. 
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standard practice, the Department of Labor requires evidence of 
mental or physical disabilities when an individual claims benefits 
under section 7385s 3(d)(2)(c).212  Watson failed to provide the 
necessary evidence to meet the requirements for a claim of 
“incapable of self-support,” thus the Department of Labor did not act 
arbitrarily or capriciously in denying Watson’s claim for additional 
compensation under the Act.213 
 
Impact: 
 
With this decision, the Sixth Circuit showed deference to the 
Department of Labor and Congress’s established interpretation of 
who is deemed eligible for federal benefit programs.  This deference 
effectively narrows the scope of covered individuals.  The Sixth 
Circuit may have upheld the narrow scope of qualifying individuals 
for practical purposes.  A broad interpretation of covered survivors, 
as Watson advocates, would expand the definition of covered 
survivors beyond those reasonably intended by Congress to have 
access to federal benefit programs, and the broad interpretation 
would quickly exhaust the financial capacity of federal benefit 
programs and recovery funds.  Thus, through this decision, the Sixth 
Circuit recognized and upheld Congress’s established interpretation 
of who constitutes a covered survivor. 
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